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The United States has the distinction of being the only industrialized nation without 
universal health insurance. Health insurance may have impacts on the US labor market. 
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health insurance on wages and worker sorting has evolved. We ﬁnd that the provision of 
health insurance increasingly inﬂuences wage inequality. Our results indicate that the 
portion of the unadjusted wage gap due only to selection bias from unobserved (to the 
analyst) characteristics, such as ability or innate health status has grown rapidly since 
2000. Further, while there have been substantial changes in how displaced workers sort to 
ﬁrms that oﬀer health insurance beneﬁts over the last 25 years, many of the patterns have 
reversed directions over the past six years. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of 
our results.  
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The United States has the distinction of being the only industrialized nation without
universal health insurance. The majority of workers in the United States receive health
insurance through their employer. With the US election looming in 2008, the politics of
health care are heating up and many of the presidential candidates are proposing ambitious
policies to either reform the current health insurance system or introduce universal health
insurance. These proposed policies and the attention paid to health insurance in current
political debates are driven by a large number of trends that are emerging in the economy.
First, employment-based coverage is declining due in part to the rapidly rising costs
of insurance premiums each year.1 Fewer employers are now oﬀering health insurance,
and among those that provide these beneﬁts, cost sharing has been introduced which
increases shares of the premium cost, co-pays, deductibles that employees are responsible
for.2 Further, numerous companies including General Motors and IBM are eliminating
coverage for many of their retirees. As the number of uninsured continues to increase
there are increased concerns that costs for the uninsured will be shifted to the insured
through higher premiums and some believe that this could lead to a partial unravelling
of the current system
Standard economic theory would predict that the higher costs of health insurance
will be passed on to workers in the form of lower wages. Yet existence of a wage health
insurance compensating diﬀerential has been diﬃcult to establish.3 This paper extends our
earlier work (Lehrer and Pereira (2007)) by updating our understanding of the connection
between health insurance provision and the labor market using over 25 years of data. In
1See Baicker and Chandra (2006) for details.
2The share of all businesses oﬀering health beneﬁts declined from 69 percent in 2000 to 60 percent by
2005, driven largely by decreases among small to mid-size ﬁrms.
3In his review of the compensating diﬀerentials literature, Pauly (2001) sustains the existing studies
do not provide compelling evidence, either in favor, or against the existence of this trade-oﬀ. Currie and
Madrian (1999) also present a survey of this literature and reach a similar conclusion.
2earlier work, we used data from 1984-2002 and introduced an empirical strategy that
allows observed and unobserved characteristics to be rewarded diﬀerently in ﬁrms that
provide and do not provide health insurance, and it generates estimates robust to both
employer and employee selection on unobservables to the health economics literature. The
empirical results indicated substantial changes both in how displaced workers sort across
ﬁrms when seeking reemployment and how ﬁrms select workers for employment between
1982-1992 and 1994-2002. During the latter period, the importance of selection bias in
explaining the unadjusted wage gap has diminished by over 40%, on the other hand, the
portion of this bias due only to unobserved (to the analyst) characteristics, such as ability
or innate health status more than doubled. Finally, evidence was presented that recently
displaced workers searched nearly three weeks longer for jobs that provide health beneﬁts
after 1994, suggesting that those who need health insurance shop for it.
The key contribution of this paper is to update several of our ﬁndings from using
additional data covering workers displaced between 2001-2006 regarding i) the existence
and robustness of any potential wage and health insurance trade-oﬀ and ii) decompose
the wage gap between ﬁrms that oﬀer and do not oﬀer health insurance yielding insights
into how workers sort into new jobs. Recent years were characterized by a remarkable
amount of inﬂa t i o ni nh e a l t hc a r ec o s t sa n dh e a l t hi n s u r a n c ep r e m i u m s . B e t w e e n2 0 0 1
and 2005 health insurance premiums grew by no less than nine percent each year, ranging
between 9.2 percent and 13.9 percent annually for premiums for a family of four. Over
these ﬁve years the number of uninsured increased by 12.3% to 47 million in 2006. Alot
of public attention has been to the increasing number of uninsured children totaling 8.7
million, or 11.7 percent, in 2006. The percentage of people who received health beneﬁts
through an employer declined to 59.7% in 2006, from 66.0% in 2000.
Understanding how the provision of health insurance aﬀects the labor market has
substantial policy and human resource implications. While surveys of workers consistently
rank health insurance as far and away the most important among all beneﬁts oﬀered in
3the workplace (Salisbury, 2001) there is little evidence on how health insurance inﬂuences
a number of labor market decisions at the micro and macro level. Many individuals may
be reluctant to consider working for companies that do not provide health beneﬁts,4 and
employers armed with knowledge must determine how they respond to the increased costs
in providing these beneﬁts. Are current workers willing to accept lower wages for these
beneﬁts, and if not how will the composition of employees for a given ﬁrm. Our empirical
analysis yields new insights on how the provision of health insurance aﬀects wage levels,
the variance of wages across ﬁrms and the search patterns of newly displaced workers.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the economic
model and empirical method introduced to the health economics literature in Lehrer and
Pereira (2007) that is employed to estimate the parameters of the model. The data used
in our analysis is described in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses our empirical
results. We ﬁnd that the provision of health insurance continues to substantially inﬂuence
wage inequality. However, we ﬁnd that recent years have been characterized by increasing
residual wage dispersion in the sector of ﬁrms that does not provide beneﬁts. The results
are consistent with decreased coverage for highly compensated workers who would place
an increased value to non-wage compensation due to the diﬀerence in the tax treatment
of wage and non-wage compensation. Empirical patterns of how displaced workers sort
across ﬁrms when seeking reemployment and how ﬁrms select workers for employment has
changed markedly over the last 25 years. We observe that the portion of the unadjusted
wage gap due only to selection bias from unobserved (to the analyst) characteristics, such
as ability or innate health status has grown rapidly since 2000. Finally, we ﬁnd that
recently displaced workers continue to search nearly three additional weeks for jobs that
provide health beneﬁts, continuing to suggest that those who need health insurance shop
for it. Yet, we also ﬁnd that the unobserved productivity attributes of workers in the
health insurance sector has undergone a dramatic rise in recent years and correspond-
4Madrian (1994) ﬁnds that among married men with pregnant wives, those without health insurance
are twice as likely to switch jobs.
4ingly, the returns to those characteristics in that sector have also grown. A ﬁnal section
summarizes our ﬁndings and discusses the implications for proposals that aim to reform
the health insurance system in the US.
2E c o n o m i c M o d e l
The model underlying our empirical analysis involves two sectors in which workers could
be employed. The sectors diﬀer solely in whether the ﬁrms within provide health insurance




















where xit is a vector of observed (to the market and the econometrician) characteristics,
β
N and β
H respectively represent how ﬁrms that do not provide health insurance and
ﬁrms that oﬀer these beneﬁts reward characteristics, αH = αN + HI
0
itβ
HI, and HIit is
an indicator variable that equals one when the individual is employed in the sector of
ﬁrms that oﬀers health insurance and εH
it and εN
it reﬂect sector speciﬁc residuals. These

















i are the return of the individual time invariant unobserved (to the econo-
metrician) characteristics in the respective sectors. This formulation explicitly permits
the returns to observed and unobserved characteristics to vary across sectors. Further,
we do not impose any restrictions on the joint distribution of (θ
N
i , xit) or (θ
H
i , xit),a l -
lowing for arbitrary correlations permitting workers to have both absolute advantage and
comparative advantage in the sectors.


















































HI is the direct compensating wage diﬀerential. The ﬁr s tt e r mi ns q u a r eb r a c k e t so f
equation (5) reﬂects the mechanism by which workers pay for receiving health insurance,
while the second term in square brackets reﬂects average skill diﬀerences between the
workers that select jobs that oﬀer health insurance and the workers that prefer jobs
without health insurance as part of the compensation package. Similarly, the variance of














































T h ec o m p o n e n t si ns q u a r eb r a c k e t sr e s p e c t i v e l yr e ﬂect, the impact of health insurance on
the dispersion of wages in that sector, the diﬀerential heterogeneity in workers between
sectors, and the diﬀerence in residual variance.
GMM is used to estimate the structural parameters in equation (4), where we ﬁrst re-
move θi from the wage equation via quasi-diﬀerences between wage equations in successive

















N)] and Ψ is a coeﬃcient vector
that captures diﬀerentials rewards to unobserved skills across sectors. The inclusion of
a lagged dependent variable presents a challenge to estimate equation(7). Consistent
6estimates can be obtained by GMM provided one has access to an instrumental variable
for Wit−1. Following our earlier work, we use annual state level information on the previous
job’s union coverage rate at the industry level making the hypothesis that industries with
higher union coverage rates should be associated with higher wages in the jobs prior to
displacement. We argue that it is unlikely that these state level aggregate measures are
related to the individual speciﬁc time varying unobservables in equation (7). Finally,
as a technical detail, the structural parameters are identiﬁed provided the unobserved
time invariant individual speciﬁc component of the residual is normalized to zero as a
constraint on the optimization of equation (7).5
An important feature of this empirical model is that it can nest several assumptions
that underlie many econometric estimation procedures in the health economics literature
that evaluates whether compensating diﬀerentials exist. For instance, if one sets the
Ψ =1 ,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt oaﬁrst diﬀerenced estimation procedure and imposes the
assumption that unobserved attributes are rewarded in exactly the same manner in both
sectors. The assumption of constant rewards to unobserved attributes also underlies ﬁxed
eﬀects strategies.
Unlike control function or selection correction estimation strategies, this model permits
selection of workers to a job to be on both sides of the market. Selection of a new job
is based in part on factors unobserved to the analyst, and intuitively it seems excessively
restrictive to assume that it operates exclusively on the workers’ side of the labor market.
Employers in the health insurance sector may prefer to select individuals who have higher
5The estimates of β
HI,β
H,β
N and ψ are obtained from equation (7) and summary statistics provide
information on xH = E[xit|HIit =1 ]and xN = E[xit|HIit =0 ] . Similarly, θH = E[θi|HIit =1 ]and
θN = E[θi|HIit =0 ]where θi is calculated using the predicted regressors. The gap in the variance of wages
can also be decomposed using the same information, and considering that ΣXH = Va r[xit|HIit =1 ] ,
ΣXN = Va r[xit|HIit =0 ] ,σ 2
θH = Va r[θi|HIit =1 ] ,σ 2
θN = Va r[θi|HIit =0 ] , ΣXθH = Cov[xit,θ i|HIit =
1], ΣXθN = Cov[xit,θi|HIit =0 ] ,σ 2
H = Va r[ it|HIit =1 ] , and σ2
N = Va r[ it|HIit =0 ] . Full details are
provided in Lehrer and Pereira (2007).
7values of θ
H
i , which could represent among other factors ability, motivation and health
status. A wedge in the labor market may develop if individuals with low values of θ
H
i




Instrumental variables procedure have a advantage over longitudinal estimators such
as ﬁrst diﬀerenced or ﬁxed eﬀects if we believe the regressors are measured with error.
As we describe in the next section, many of our explanatory variables could be subject
to recall error, since they are based on retroactive questions. An instrumental variables
procedure to correct for the endogeneity of past variables such as pre-displacement wages,
should reduce concerns of biases attributable to measurement error. In contrast both
ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrst diﬀerenced models are well known to generate biased estimates
when variables are measured with error and the size of the bias would be particularly
large in short panels such as that in this paper which consists of only two observation per
individual.
3D a t a
The data used in this study comes from the Displaced Worker Supplement (DWS) of
the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a comprehensive, cross-sectional sur-
vey of approximately 50,000 households in the United States. The DWS is a biennial
supplement to the CPS presenting a nationally representative cross-sectional survey of
displaced workers (those who have lost jobs because of plant closings, business failures,
and layoﬀs) and includes retrospective data several years prior to the administration of
the survey. Among these workers, their job loss resulted from exogenous decisions that
were unrelated to both their particular performance and preferences over the structure of
the compensation package.6 Most important for this study, the DWS contains informa-
6Hammermesh (1987) presents evidence from early DWS surveys that these displacements indeed
come as a surprise to the worker and ﬁrm.
8tion on wage rates and health insurance status, both on their job prior to and following
displacement.7 The DWS also includes detailed information on demographic characteris-
tics and individual labor market variables pre and post displacement for a large sample
of displaced workers.
We use data from DWS supplements collected from 1984 to 2006 and largely follow
the sampling criteria used in Simon (2001), deleting observations where workers were
either employed part-time, self-employed or held seasonal jobs.8 Relative to the nationally
representative CPS, displaced workers are disproportionately male, previously employed in
semi-skilled blue collar labor and are less likely to be a college graduate (particularly in the
1980s). The data was supplemented with information from both the January and March
CPS to obtain additional controls in our analysis. For instance, tenure information comes
from the January Basic dataset, and is calculated as the number of years the individual
have been employed in the current job.
Despite the many advantages of using the DWS data for estimating wage/health insur-
ance trade-oﬀs, there are a number of limitations that should be noted. First, the DWS
treats health insurance as a homogeneous good and there are many dimensions across
which plans vary such as annual deductible, and co-payments. We cannot accurately
measure the cost of health insurance or the part paid by the employee.9 Second, the data
set lacks information on other fringe beneﬁts such as employer provided pension plans,
7The DWS does not contain hourly wage rates and we had to calculate this variable. We assumed that
health insurance is obtained from an individual’s primary position and calculated the hourly wage rate
for this position using information in the DWS. Speciﬁcally, we took the diﬀerence between total wages
and earnings from other jobs and divided that by the average hours worked per week *weeks worked in
ay e a r .
8Simon (2001) used data from 1984 to 2000 in her analysis.
9In all waves of the survey, the health insurance information about the old job refers to health insurance
from the worker’s own employer. From 1984 to 1992, the new job health insurance variable asked for
whether any group health insurance was held, and from 1994 onwards asked whether any private health
insurance was held at the present time.
9employer provided retirement health insurance that are likely correlated with health in-
surance beneﬁts. Third, data on pre-displacement ﬁrm characteristics such as ﬁrm size
and proﬁtability are not collected. As we will discuss, this limitation is likely the most
severe. Fourth, the data lacks information on skill transferability. Fifth, the survey only
asks whether a person has private health insurance coverage but does not ask the source
that provides these beneﬁts which could lead to biases, particularly for individuals that
have spouses with family health beneﬁts. To mitigate these biases we use the March CPS
supplement as it contains more detailed information on whether employer insurance is
in their own name allowing us to verify whether this insurance is really from their own
primary employer. Unfortunately, due to the rotational structure of the CPS we lose
approximately 43% of our sample when we match respondents.10
There are two additional features of the DWS worth noting as they are related to
changes in the data collection. First, eﬀective 2003, the CPS incorporated revised industry
and occupation classiﬁcations based on the Census 2000 industry and occupation codes.
The codes represent a totally new classiﬁcation system not consistent with the old one and
we had to create matches by hand to make the codes consistent in constructing occupation
and industry codes at the two digit level.11 Second, there was a change in the recall period
for which information on job loss was collected. Until 1994 workers were asked if they
h a dl o s taj o bi nt h el a s tﬁve years, while, after 1994, the time frame was limited to
three years only. These changes, together with a shift in the political and health sector
10Approximately 6% of matched individuals privately purchased insurance and nearly 31% received
health insurance from a spouse. This subsample was removed from the analysis. Note, our qualitative
and quantitative results were robust if this subsample were included in the estimation sample. This
should reduce concerns regarding our implicit assumption that for those individuals who could not be
matched with the March CPS, health insurance reported in the DWS was obtained from the primary
employer.
11We believe that while there may be some errors in conversion at the three digit level, at the two digit
level we should properly classify all industries and occupations. Our conversion metric is available upon
request.
10environment,12 help us deﬁne sample periods to evaluate separately in our analysis.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for portions of the sample used in this study. In
the top panel, the full sample is divided into four groups, based on their health insurance
provision pre and post displacement. The majority of the sample (62.7%) corresponds to
workers that received health insurance on both jobs and are called "Always". Workers
gaining health insurance following displacement constitute 14.8% of the sample, similarly
12.3% of the sample lost health insurance beneﬁts with displacement and the remaining
10% did not receive health insurance at either job.
There are substantial diﬀerences between these groups in terms of their level of ed-
ucation, earnings, race and probability of switching industry and occupation following
displacement. The two groups of the sample that did not receive health insurance prior
to displacement have, on average, a lower level of education, a lower pre-displacement wage
a n da r em o r el i k e l yt ob eA f r i c a nA m e r i c a nt h a ng r o u p sw h i c hr e c e i v e dh e a l t hi n s u r a n c e
in both periods. Further, losing health insurance following displacement is associated with
both large wage losses and a higher likelihood of switching industry or occupation. Notice
that jobs pre and post displacement that oﬀer health insurance provide higher wages. The
usual explanation for this ﬁnding is that those employed in good jobs are likely to diﬀer
from those in worse jobs on both observable and unobservable characteristics.
In the second part of Table 1, we examine how the characteristics of the sample
diﬀer between 1984-92 and 1994 onwards. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in any
characteristics between pre and post 2000 conditional on being post 1994. After 1994,
displaced workers are more educated, slightly older, contain more females, are less likely
to have children or receive unemployment beneﬁts following displacement. While age
and education would suggest an increase in the propensity to receive health beneﬁts, not
12Health care reform was a major component of Bill Clinton’s campaign in 1992. This year also saw a
marked slowdown in medical spending and the end to a period of rapid growth in enrollment in managed
care plan. While 5% of the privately insured were in managed care in 1980 it had risen to approximately
75% in 1992 and that percentage has been fairly stable since 1992.
11having children could serve to reduce the beneﬁts from receiving health coverage from an
employer. Interestingly, more workers in our sample over the last twelve years received
health insurance following displacement, which is the opposite of the pattern in the general
labor market.
4R e s u l t s
Using GMM estimates of equation (7) we decompose the unadjusted health insurance wage
gap into a true eﬀect of health insurance on wages and a selection bias component following
equation (5). The results are presented in Table 2 and the ﬁrst column conducts the
decomposition for the entire sample period. Health insurance has substantial impacts on
workers in the health insurance sector that primarily operate through diﬀerential returns
to observed characteristics. For the full sample, over 80% of the eﬀect of health insurance
on workers in the health insurance sector operates through this channel. Further, the role
of unobserved factors is limited.
The change in the components of the wage decomposition between 1984-1992 and
1994-2006 as well as 2000-2006 is respectively presented in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table
2. Between these periods, the unadjusted wage gap has grown, which is, in part, (and
consistent with Farber and Levy (2000)) due to ﬁrms which stopped oﬀering beneﬁts over
this time period tended to be clustered in low-paying industries. The prime component
that explains the growth in the unadjusted wage gap between sectors is the substantial
increase in the returns to observed skills. The returns to these skills have more than
doubled between periods. Examining the second, third and fourth columns of Appendix
Table 1, it is clear that these rewards are being driven by the increased returns to a college
education as well as returns to age, which may proxy for total labor market experience.13
13This suggests that, conditional on characteristics, some workers may have a comparative advantage
in the health insurance sector, which, based on the diﬀerences in the magnitude of the coeﬃcient between
columns two and three, appears to be of increasing importance in recent years.
12Not only did the returns to observed skills rise across periods, but there was also a large
decrease in the amount of the gap that is attributable to selection bias. Overall selection
bias dropped by nearly 30%, from 0.179 to 0.107 driven by the diﬀerences in observed skills
across sectors. Information on the portion of selection bias attributable to observables and
unobservables is presented in rows six and seven of Table 2, respectively. Selection bias
due to unobservables measures the similarity in average unobserved attributes between
workers in the two sectors (i.e. θH and θN). The ﬁfth row of Table 2 indicates that the gap
in these attributes has become smaller between periods pre and post 1993. On average,
workers employed in ﬁrms that oﬀer health insurance have larger values associated with




than those employed in ﬁrms that




. Yet, the portion of selection bias due to unobserved
skills that cannot be accounted for by estimators such as OLS and matching has risen
markedly since 2000. In fact, in the last six year period, it has grown by more than 150%
relative to the period between 1994-1999. Since θH > θN, and the health insurance wage
gap is slightly higher for individuals with higher unobserved skills, we would predict that
the OLS estimates of the compensating wage diﬀerential would be biased upwards. This
indicates that over the last six years we have seen a great increase in the unobserved
productivity attributes of workers in the sector that provides health insurance.
The ﬁrst row of Table 2 presents estimates of the compensating wage diﬀerential.
Health insurance is not signiﬁcantly related to workers wage in any of the samples. The
sign of the coeﬃcient estimate is never consistent with the compensating wage diﬀerential
theory. While this result does not diﬀer from most estimates found in the compensating
diﬀerential literature, Lehrer and Pereira(2007) suggest that is likely due to the existence
frictions in the labor market and substantial heterogeneity regarding preferences for health
insurance beneﬁts among workers within ﬁrms.
Our GMM estimates are also used to decompose the unadjusted gap in variance of
wages between sectors following equation (6). The results are presented in Table 3. The
13unadjusted gap appears small and indicates that health insurance reduces the dispersion
of wages between sectors.14 While the overall size of the diﬀerence between the variance of
wages between sectors becomes smaller after 1994, the role of the two major components of
the decomposition, the eﬀect of health insurance on health insurance workers and selection
bias, increases markedly. In particular, the portion of selection bias due to diﬀerences in
unobserved skills and the direct eﬀect of both observed and unobserved skills on the
variance of wages increase by over 50% between the periods. However, following 2000
how unobserved skills aﬀects the variance of wages undergoes a dramatic transformation.
That is, while they decreasingly aﬀect the eﬀect of health insurance in the health insurance
sector, they play a drastically diﬀerent role in terms of selection bias. In particular, the
residual wage dispersion in the non-health insurance sector expands rapidly in part since a
large number of high paid workers who previously had beneﬁts no longer receive them. It
appears that the ﬁrms who are dropping coverage over the last six years are not clustered
among low paying jobs which is opposite the pattern that came about between 1994
top 2000. Taken together, while workers appeared on average to be increasingly more
homogeneous across sectors in Table 2, the results in the ﬁf t hr o wo fT a b l e3s u g g e s tt h a t
there is substantially more heterogeneity in the unobserved skills of individuals working
in the health insurance sector (relative to the other sector) after 1994, yet the direction
of these changes in heterogeneity varies over the 12 year period.
In Table 3, we found that employers in the health insurance sector did not pay workers
diﬀerently on the basis of these unobserved skills and increasingly rewarded observed skills.
If employers assume that observed productivity skills are highly positively correlated with
unobserved skills it may be the case that this heterogeneity has led employers to increase
the reward to observed characteristics. While this should suggest that the variance in
the wages between the sectors would increase across the two sample periods, there is, as
reported in the second row of Table 4 a large oﬀset. This oﬀset arises since unobserved
14Recall this is the gap in the variance of log hourly wages. This gap is small relative to the gap in
average log hourly wages.
14skills have signiﬁcantly reduced the variance of wages for health insurance workers in the
health insurance sector.
The ﬁndings in Table 3 are also consistent with selection operating on both sides
of the labor market, which rules out traditional selection correction or control function
estimators. The negative covariance in the sixth row indicates that observed and unob-
served skills are positively correlated in the sector that does not provide health insurance,
but negatively correlated in the health insurance sector. This is consistent with positive
selection among workers with low unobserved skills in the health insurance sector and
negative selection among workers with high observed skills. This selection becomes more
important over time as the size of the covariance terms increases by over 50% between
the sample periods. This positive selection may be a result of increased worker shopping
for positions that oﬀer health insurance beneﬁts and may have partially contributed to
the recent health insurance cost spiral for employers.
In our estimation, we used the average unionization rate in the industry the worker
was employed in pre-displacement to instrument for previous period wage. To assess
the suitability of our instrument we consider a simple OLS regression of the ﬁrst stage
regression and run an F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the instrument. The results
are presented in Table 4 for the case with information on unionization coverage rates.
Coeﬃcients on the instrument and exogenous regressors in both columns are reasonable
in sign and magnitude. The instruments are statistically signiﬁcant predictors of pre-
displacement wages and the F-statistics on its signiﬁcance is respectively above current
cutoﬀs (i.e. Staiger and Stock (1997)) for weak instruments for both the full sample and
pre-1994 sample. Since the reliability of our estimates depends directly on the validity of
our instrument, the low F-statistic over post 1994 period and post 2000 was a concern we
followed Lehrer and Pereira (2007) and conducted a number of diagnostics that i) rejected
weak identiﬁcation driving the results, ii) demonstrated the robustness of the results to
alternative speciﬁcations.
15Finally, we used estimates from the model to test whether assumptions that underlie
alternative estimation approaches used to est i m a t et h ew a g e-h e a l t hi n s u r a n c et r a d e o ﬀ
are supported. First, we ﬁnd for the full pooled sample, Ψ is statistically diﬀerent from





i , implying that unobserved skills are rewarded diﬀerently in the two sectors of the
economy. The assumption that unobserved heterogeneity has a constant impact across
sectors underlies ﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁrst diﬀerence and diﬀerence in diﬀerence propensity score
matching estimators. Imposing the constraint that Ψ =1, would introduce an omitted se-
lection eﬀect that will bias the impacts reported using traditional longitudinal estimators.
Second, our results in Table 2 clearly demonstrated that there is substantial selection
bias due to unobserved skills. the presence of these factors would aﬀect OLS and cross
sectional matching estimates of the impact of health insurance on wages. We examined
as i m p l eO L Se s t i m a t eo ft h ei m p a c to fh e a l t hi n s u r a n c ei nas i m p l ew a g ee q u a t i o na n d
it does exceed the true eﬀect of health insurance on wages reported in Table 2.15 Finally,
the ﬁndings in Table 3 are also consistent with selection operating on both sides of the la-
bor market, which rules out traditional selection correction or control function estimators.
The negative covariance in the sixth row indicates that observed and unobserved skills are
positively correlated in the sector that does not provide health insurance, but negatively
correlated in the health insurance sector. This is consistent with positive selection among
workers with low unobserved skills in the health insurance sector and negative selection
among workers with high observed skills.
4.1 Indirect Evidence on Worker Sorting Patterns
Testing directly for worker sorting is diﬃcult without more detailed information on ﬁrms.
We use diﬀerence in diﬀerence strategies to present additional evidence that is consistent
15The OLS estimate may also suﬀer from bias if there are correlations between observed attributes and
θi.
16with the hypothesis of an increase in worker sorting. We reexamined whether there were
changes in the job search patterns between post displacement health insurance receipt
conditional on pre displacement health insurance receipt over time pre and post 2000
conditional on post 1994. We found no evidence of any shifts in change patterns as
recently displaced workers continue to search nearly three weeks longer for jobs that
provide health beneﬁts since 1994.16 While there was no additional eﬀect, this time
period was one of high economic growth and low unemployment (with the exception of
a brief period between 2001-2002) so one can argue that the macro conditions would be
biased against us ﬁnding a positive impact.
We also examined if individuals with lower unobserved productivity attributes are
continuing to increasingly sort to jobs that provide health insurance beneﬁts. Since there
does not exist a single data set that can directly address whether individuals in poorer
health status labor market sorting is contributing to the rise in health insurance costs, we
examine whether the correlations between workers’ unobserved productivity characteris-
tics of workers and health insurance are increasing. To accomplish this goal we consider
estimation of
b θi = γ1 + HI
0
itγ2 +( HIit ∗ t2)
0γ3 + t
0
2γ4 +( HIit ∗ t3)
0γ5 + t
0
3γ6 + vit (8)
where t2 is a dummy for the period after 1994, t3 i sad u m m yf o rt h ep e r i o da f t e r2 0 0 0a n d
b θi is the predicted individual time invariant characteristics obtained from OLS estimation
of the following equation
θit = δ1 + θit−1δ2 +  it (9)
where  it is a random unobservable, θit is calculated using GMM estimates from the
ﬁrst column of Appendix Table 1. Intuitively, b θi can be thought of as a estimate of the
true signal of unobserved attributes from an equation that corrects for measurement error
16A table of results are available upon request but the numbers are similar to those in Table 6 of Lehrer
and Pereira (2007). The key ﬁnding is that this impact did not undergo any additional change over the
last six years.
17from two mismeasured variables whose errors are unrelated. After all, θit and θit−1 are
measured with error since they include ξit and ξit−1 respectively. Since the model described
in Section 2 assumes that ηis in equation (3) is distributed iid over time, estimating
equation (9) corresponds to regressing two variables with classical measurement error on
each other and obtaining the true signal as the predicted outcome.
Table 5 present estimates of equation (8) based on samples deﬁned by pre-displacement
health insurance status and age. In the top panel we restrict γ5 =0and γ6 =0 .In the
middle panel γ3 =0and γ4 =0are the restrictions imposed. The bottom panel presents
estimates of the unrestricted model. For the full sample in column one, we notice that,
while health insurance is associated with higher unobserved attributes (γ2 > 0), the
recipients in the second time period actually have lower values of θi (γ4 < 0). This
indicates that individuals who have health insurance in the period post 1994 have on
average values of θi that are 0.033 lower then the earlier time period. This eﬀect is large
and approximately equal to a 4% of the standard deviation of θi. Columns four and seven
present evidence that the magnitude of this negative impact is not heterogeneous with
respect to whether or not an individual had health insurance pre-displacement. When
we examine subsamples that are deﬁned by age several interesting patterns emerge. The
estimates of γ3 in the third, sixth and ninth columns demonstrate that there is a large
decrease in θi associated with receiving health insurance after 1994 for workers above 45.
In contrast workers under the age of 45 either have γ3 estimates that are statistically
insigniﬁcant (column eight) or of limited economic signiﬁcance (columns two and ﬁve).
Yet, there has been some dramatic changes after 2000 recipients in the second time period
actually have higher values of θi (γ5 > 0). The positive impact is driven primarily by
younger workers indicating that ﬁrms in the health insurance sector may be responding to
worker sorting by being more careful in their selection. We hypothesize that an employer
could get a more accurate signal of θi from younger workers than older workers. Since the
employers are recognizing sorting they have increased the rewarded paid to unobserved
18attributes in the last ﬁv ey e a r sa sr e p o r t e di nt h eﬁrst row of Table 5.
The results in Table 5 suggest that while on average unobserved productivity attributes
are greater in the period following 1994, there is a signiﬁcant negative association between
these unobserved productivity attributes and receiving employer provided health insur-
ance after 1994. This eﬀect is driven by workers that are at least 45 years of age. Yet, the
reversal of this trend in the last ﬁve years is driven by younger workers. Taken together,
we hypothesize the results in this section suggest that, among individuals who have health
insurance in the period post 1994, they have i) lower values of θi, unobserved productiv-
ity attributes that may include health status, and ii) the search for another position that
provides these beneﬁts lasted an additional two weeks. These individuals are most likely
familiar with health insurance beneﬁts and may have increasingly seeked out jobs that
oﬀer this amenity. Yet, since ﬁr m sa r ea w a r eo ft h i sb e h a v i o rt h e yh a v eb e e nb e t t e ra b l e
to identify unobserved productivity attributes from prospective candidates particularly
among young workers which as a result led to the increased returns to unobserved skills
on wage levels since 2000.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we extended our earlier work and examined how health insurance aﬀects
wages in the US labor market. One of the striking features of the US labor market is how
both workers and ﬁrms have adjusted their employment patterns in response to changes
in the costs of health insurance. While previous research has documented that the recent
rise in health insurance premiums have impacts on several dimensions of the labor market
including how premiums are transferred to workers (e.g. Gruber and Lettau (2004)), hours
worked and employment rates (e.g. Cutler and Madrian (1998) and Baicker and Chandra
(2006)), mixed impacts on wage levels (Pauly and Herring (1999) and Simon (2001));
our work further indicates there are also substantial impacts on wage inequality and
19worker sorting.17 Speciﬁcally, our evidence indicates that the provision of health insurance
increasingly aﬀect is the dispersion of wages across sectors, but the direction in which this
operates is changing as more high wage workers are not receiving health insurance beneﬁts
from their employers. Thus, the variance of wages in the non-health insurance sector has
grown dramatically contributing to selection bias from unobserved factors. Estimates
from our model are also used to decompose the wage gap between the sectors and we
ﬁnd there are substantial changes in the selection of workers to ﬁrms that provide health
insurance beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, we observe that there has been increased sorting based
on comparative advantage since 1994. Finally, we ﬁnd that recently displaced workers are
searching nearly three weeks longer for jobs that provide health beneﬁts but while these
workers on average had lower unobserved productivity attributes between 1994 to 2000,
relative to pre 1994; a reversal has occurred over the last ﬁve years. It appears that ﬁrms
are increasingly responding to the costs of higher health insurance in their hiring patterns
of displaced workers. As a result, they have also increased the reward workers receive
based on these characteristics.
An important limitation of this study is that the impacts we estimate are applicable to
displaced workers only. The composition of displaced workers not only diﬀers from other
workers in the labor market, but has also changed over time.18 Yet, our ﬁndings have
some limited external validity as they are in general consistent with much of the recent
health economics literature indicating impacts on a variety of labor market outcomes.
As the politics of health care show no signs of cooling oﬀ, our analysis suggests that
17There is, indeed, some evidence of worker sorting in the context of health insurance within the health
economics literature. Several studies (Marquis and Long (1995), Monheit and Vistnes (1999) and Levy
(1998)) show that workers with low preferences for health insurance are disproportionately employed
in ﬁrms that do not oﬀer coverage. Similarly evidence of employees sorting to ﬁrms based on health
insurance beneﬁts is shown in Scott, Berger and Black (1989), Dranove, Spier and Baker (2000), and
Levy (1998). Yet, the evidence also indicates that sorting of workers to ﬁrms on the basis of preferences
for the compensation package is imperfect.
18Farber (2003) describes how the characteristics of displaced workers have changed over time.
20in proposing policies to reform the US health insurance system one must consider the
consequences for both the labor market and wage inequality. While work examining
the staggered introduction of national health insurance in Canada (Gruber and Hanratty,
1995) concluded that after the introduction employment rose, wages increased and average
hours were unchanged; these reforms occurred in a diﬀerent era. Our empirical evidence
indicates that the role of health insurance on the workers in the health insurance sector
has grown by 78% since 1994, there is increased sorting that does not follow a consistent
trend and increased impacts on wage inequality.
Further, if a public health insurance system were introduced, it is likely that it would
be ﬁnanced by a payroll tax shared between employers and employees. The same supply
and demand factors will continue to operate and it is reasonable to expect some non-
compliance with new taxes. A large empirical literature has independently documented
that i) a positive correlation between the size of underground economy and changes in
tax rates (e.g. Clotfelter, 1983 Crane and Nourzad, 1986), ii) tax cuts may increase tax
revenue (e.g. Feldstein, 1995 or Goolsbee, 2000) and iii) the characteristics of workers
who are likely to evade a health insurance tax and work in the informal sector are not just
clustered at the bottom of the income distribution but at higher levels who feel as if they
are “invited” to participate in this sector. Ignoring the labor supply impacts from a new
tax this could have large macroeconomic consequences and transform the importance of
several sources that drive increasing wage inequality from factors that are rewarded in the
labor market such as college education to factors that aﬀect the likelihood of tax evasion.
Such policies may increase sorting based on comparative advantage as workers will not
be forced to sort to jobs based on this beneﬁts. However, since health insurance coverage
at the workplace is correlated with other non-pecuniary beneﬁts such as day-care, private
pension coverage the eﬀects may be limited. Further, it is uncertain if ﬁrms with large bills
due to retiree health insurance would either increase investment or represent a windfall
gain for shareholders. In conclusion, further study is required and a health insurance
21experiment that does not simply randomize premiums or co-pays (as in the classic Rand
study) but focuses on guaranteed coverage irrespective of employment for treatment group
members could be useful to help guide the design of future health insurance policies to
minimize labor market distortions and poor macroeconomic consequences.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
By Health 
Insurance Status 
on Both Jobs  
Gainers of HI 
Post displacement job 
has Health Insurance 
Never Have 
Neither job has 
Health Insurance 
Always Have 
Both jobs provided 
Health Insurance 
  Losers of HI 
Pre displacement job 
has Health Insurance 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD    Mean SD 
Real weekly wage 
after displacement in 
US$  519.347  317.878 658.127 383.147 367.226 247.435 
 
415.652  262.314
Real weekly wage pre 
displacement in US$  526.384  345.894 733.458 419.259 417.867 278.890    579.383  326.019
Age  36.816  10.357  38.856  10.071  35.277  10.778    36.749  10.267 
Level of education 
below college  0.498  0.500  0.440  0.496  0.648  0.478    0.583  0.493 
Female  0.467  0.499  0.374  0.484  0.479  0.500    0.406  0.491 
Married  0.675  0.468  0.680  0.466  0.484  0.500    0.530  0.499 
Black  0.076  0.266  0.074  0.262  0.125  0.331    0.116  0.320 
Years of tenure pre 
displacement  3.669  4.231  6.857  6.851  3.262  3.856    5.459  5.642 
Same Industry  0.417  0.493  0.470  0.499  0.459  0.498    0.340  0.474 
Same Occupation  0.369  0.483  0.372  0.483  0.349  0.477    0.268  0.443 
Number of 
Observations  2549 1737  10768    2119 
By Time Period  1984-2006  1994-2006  2000-2006 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Log of Pre Displacement 
Real Weekly Wage in US$  6.346 
 
0.573  6.465  0.609  6.407  0.609 
Log of Post-Displacement 
Real Weekly Wage in US$  6.199 
 
0.647  6.332  0.720  6.294  0.672 
Insurance in Old Job  0.751  0.433  0.748  0.434  0.732  0.443 
Insurance in New Job  0.775  0.417  0.792  0.406  0.791  0.407 
Female 0.407  0.491  0.440  0.496  0.434  0.496 
Married 0.638  0.481  0.610  0.488  0.611  0.487 
Black 0.086  0.280  0.089  0.285  0.084  0.277 
Age between 35 and 44  0.304  0.460  0.308  0.462  0.315  0.464 
Age between 45 and 54  0.205  0.403  0.282  0.450  0.252  0.434 
Age over 55  0.084  0.278  0.103  0.304  0.090  0.286 
High School Education  0.371  0.483  0.296  0.457  0.307  0.461 
Some College Education  0.282  0.450  0.317  0.465  0.322  0.467 
College 0.249  0.432  0.328  0.470  0.306  0.461 
Children 0.634  0.482  0.429  0.495  0.445  0.497 
Tenure on Job Pre-
Displacement (in years)  5.913 
 
6.336  6.111  6.473  6.113  6.513 
Observations 14968  9429  5539 
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Table 2: Decomposition of the Unadjusted Weekly Wage Gap    
 
 
Note: The decomposition is based on equation (5) and we use the estimates presented in 
Appendix Table 1 to construct each component. 
  
  1984-2006 1984-1992 1994-2006  2000-2006 
Effect of health insurance on workers in health 
insurance sector: 
            
   1. Compensating Wage Differential, 
HI β   0.058   0.054  0.029   0.014 
   2. Effect of observed skills,  ( )
N H
H x β β −
'   0.223   0.156 0.358   0.347 
   3. Effect of unobserved skills, () H θ ψ 1 −   0.015   0.000  0.016  0.006 
 Total  effect  0.238    0.210 0.374   0.352 
        
Selection bias:         
   4. Differences in observed skills, ( )
N
N H x x β
' ' −   0.096 0.132 0.071   0.046 
   5. Differences in unobserved skills, ( ) N H θ θ −   0.023 0.047 0.038   0.067   
 Total  bias  0.118 0.179 0.109   0.114 
    Unadjusted wage gap (WG)  0.414  
 
0.389 0.455   
 
0.452  
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Table 3: Decomposition of the Unadjusted Variance of Weekly Wages Gap 
 
  1984-2002 1984-1992  1994-2006 2000-2006 
Effect of health insurance on workers in health 
insurance sector: 
            





H β β β β Σ − Σ
' '  
0.066 0.043  0.078 0.071 
   2. Effect of unobserved skills, ( )
2 2 1
H θ σ − ψ   -0.192 -0.047  -0.170 -0.073 
   3. Covariance term,  ( ) H X
N H
θ β ψβ Σ − ' 2  0.004 0.005 0.007 0.009 
  Total  effect  -0.123 0.002  -0.084 0.007 
       
Selection  bias:       




N β β Σ − Σ
'  
-0.001 0.002  -0.001 0.000 
   5. Differences in unobserved skills, 
2 2
N H θ θ σ σ −  
0.115 0.000  0.057 -0.094 
   6. Covariance term,  () N X H X
N
θ θ β Σ − Σ
' 2  -0.024 -0.015 -0.027 -0.026 
 Total  bias  0.090 -0.014  0.030 -0.121 
Difference in residual variance, 
2 2
N H σ σ −   -0.003 -0.002  -0.002 -0.001 
    Unadjusted variance gap (WG)  -0.036  -0.014  -0.057  -0.114 
       
 
Note: The decomposition is based on equation (6) and we use the estimates presented in 
Table 1 to construct each component.  28
Table 4: First Stage Regressions of Pre Displacement Wage Assuming  1 = ψ  
Time Period  1984-2002 1984-1992  1994-2006  2000-2006 











































































































































































































Note: Regressions include information on gender, Hispanic, family composition, employer 
industry, unemployment insurance use, region of residence indicators and their interactions with 
health insurance. Robust standard errors in parentheses and . 
a, 
b and 
c denote statistically different 
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively.  29




Full Sample  Health Insurance Pre Displacement  No Health Insurance Pre 
Displacement 
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Indicator variable for Period 



















Comparing Trends Pre and Post 2000 




















Health Insurance post 



















Indicator variable for Period 
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Indicator variable for Period 
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Indicator variable for Period 



















Number of Observations  17233  12258  4975 12934  9066 3868 4299 3192 1107 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
***, ** and * denote statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence 
levels, respectively.  31
Appendix Table 1: GMM Estimates of the Wage Equation  
  1984-2006 1984-1992  1994-2006 2000-2006 








Point estimates of the returns to unobserved 



































































































































































































































Observations 17173  9387  7786  4273 
Note: Regressions also include indicators on employer industry and region of residence and their interactions 
with health insurance. Standard errors in parentheses, 
a, 
b and 
c denote statistically different from zero at the 1%, 
5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively for column 2. 